sciresНаучные исследования экономического факультета. Электронный журналScientific Research of Faculty of Economics. Electronic Journal2078-3809Moscow State University10.38050/2078-3809-2020-12-4-56-87scires-171Research ArticleКОНКУРЕНТНАЯ И ПРОМЫШЛЕННАЯ ПОЛИТИКАCOMPETITION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICYОграничение конкуренции на «обычных» и многосторонних рынках: общее и особенноеRestriction of Competition on “Traditional” and Multi-lateral Markets: Common Features and PeculiaritiesДудринаВ. А.DudrinaV. A.

 г. Москва

Valeriya A. Dudrina - Student, Faculty of Economics

Moscow

dudrina.lera@yandex.ruСлужевскаяВ. ДSluzhevskaiiaV D.

Служевская Валерия Дмитриевна - ведущий экономист МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова, Экономический факультет; младший научный сотрудник Центра исследований конкуренции и экономического регулирования РАНХиГС при Президенте РФ

Valeriia D. Sluzhevskaiia - Leading Economist Lomonosov Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics; Junior Research Fellow, RANEPA, Center for Studies of Competition and Economic Regulation

sluzhevskaya@econ.msu.ruМГУ имени М.В. ЛомоносоваРоссияLomonosov Moscow State UniversityRussian FederationМГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова; РАНХиГС при Президенте РФРоссияLomonosov Moscow State University; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public AdministrationRussian Federation2020311220201245687Copyright © Дудрина В.А., Служевская В.Д., 20202020Дудрина В.А., Служевская В.Д.Dudrina V.A., Sluzhevskaiia V.D.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://scires.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/171

Несмотря на то, что многосторонние рынки – не новое явление, именно по мере цифровизации экономики их число и, соответственно, внимание к ним как ученых, так и регуляторов начало расти. Распространение таких рынков неизбежно ставит перед экономистами и антимонопольными регуляторами ряд вопросов: что представляют из себя многосторонние рынки? Насколько сильно они отличаются от традиционных? Каким образом необходимо подходить к их регулированию: игнорировать различия между двумя типами рынков или, наоборот, концентрировать свое внимание именно на них? То, какие будут даны ответы на вышеперечисленные вопросы, имеет большое значение, так как именно от них будет зависеть как дальнейшая политика действий антимонопольных регуляторов, так и благосостояние потребителей и фирм.

В данной работе рассматриваются различия и схожие характеристики традиционных и многосторонних рынков, а также теоретические аспекты их регулирования. Авторы данной работы проводят анализ подходов, которые на практике используются антимонопольными регуляторами ЕС, Германии, Великобритании, США и России.

 

Though multi-sided markets are not a new phenomenon, scientists and regulators’ interest in this subject started to rise significantly exactly with the economy's digitalization. The proliferation of such markets inevitably raises a number of questions for economists and antitrust regulators: what are multilateral markets? How much do they differ from the «traditional» ones? What approach should we choose for their regulation: ignore the differences between the two types of the markets, or, on the contrary, focus exactly on them? The answers given to the above questions are of great importance, since they will determine both the future of antitrust policy as well as the welfare of consumers and firms.

This paper examines the differences and similar characteristics of «traditional» and multisided markets, as well as the theoretical aspects of their regulation. Also, the authors of the paper analyze the approaches used by antitrust regulators in the EU,Germany, theUnited Kingdom, theUnited StatesandRussia.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.