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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">scires</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Научные исследования экономического факультета. Электронный журнал</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Scientific Research of Faculty of Economics. Electronic Journal</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="epub">2078-3809</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Moscow State University</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.38050/2078-3809-2024-16-1-24-45</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">scires-287</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>КОНКУРЕНТНАЯ И ПРОМЫШЛЕННАЯ ПОЛИТИКА</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>COMPETITION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Определение границ рынка для цифровых платформ: теория и антимонопольная практика</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Defining a Relevant Market for Digitals Platforms: Theory and Regulatory Practice</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Леваков</surname><given-names>П. А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Levakov</surname><given-names>P. A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Леваков Павел Александрович, аспирант, экономический факультет; стажер-исследователь</p><p>г. Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Pavel A. Levakov, Faculty of Economics, Research Assistant</p><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">levakoff97@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова; РАНХиГС, Институт прикладных экономических исследований</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Lomonosov Moscow State University; RANEPA University, Institute of Applied Economic Research</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2024</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>12</day><month>04</month><year>2024</year></pub-date><volume>16</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>24</fpage><lpage>45</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Леваков П.А., 2024</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2024</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Леваков П.А.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Levakov P.A.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://scires.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/287">https://scires.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/287</self-uri><abstract><p>На многих рынках цифровые платформы занимают доминирующее положение, в связи с чем возникает необходимость оценки их деятельности с точки зрения антимонопольного законодательства. Для этого необходимо определить границы релевантного рынка, что для рынков с цифровыми платформами связано с целым рядом методологических проблем. Во-первых, классические методы определения границ рынка могут давать неверные результаты из-за феномена нулевых цен. Во-вторых, цифровые платформы могут функционировать на многосторонних рынках, для которых требуется рассматривать границы рынка для каждой группы агентов.В статье рассматриваются теоретико-методологические подходы к оценке границ рынка для цифровых платформ и антимонопольная практика. В том числе оценивается, как определение границ рынка повлияло на принятые регулятором решения. Делается вывод, что именно определение границ рынка оказало ключевое влияние на результаты антимонопольных разбирательств против цифровых платформ. Также сравниваются подходы к определению границ рынка российского и зарубежных антимонопольных регуляторов. На основе проведенного анализа обобщается подход к определению границ рынка для цифровых платформ.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>On many markets digital platforms hold a dominant position, which requires an assessment of their actions from an antitrust point of view. To do this, it is necessary to assess the boundaries of the relevant market, which is associated with a number of methodological problems. Firstly, due to the presence of the phenomenon of zero prices, traditional methodology can produce incorrect results. Secondly, digital platforms function on multisided markets and thus it is required to define market boundaries for each group of agents.In this article theoretical approaches to assessing market boundaries for digital platforms and antitrust practice are considered. The paper dwells on the theoretical and methodological aspects of the definition of market boundaries for digital platforms and how these definitions turn into antitrust practices and influence the decisions made by regulatory authorities. The author argues that it's the market boundaries' definition that was the key influence on many antitrust proceedings against digital platforms. In addition, methodological approaches to determining market boundaries of Russian and foreign antimonopoly regulators are compared. Based on this analysis, an approach to determining market boundaries for digital platforms is proposed.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>цифровые платформы</kwd><kwd>многосторонние рынки</kwd><kwd>границы рынка</kwd><kwd>релевантный рынок</kwd><kwd>антимонопольное законодательство</kwd><kwd>международный опыт</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>digital platforms</kwd><kwd>multisided markets</kwd><kwd>market boundaries</kwd><kwd>relevant market</kwd><kwd>antitrust law</kwd><kwd>international experience</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Белокрылова О.С. Идентификация границ рынка: особенности электронного сегмента // Пространство экономики. 2011. № 4–3. C. 6–10.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Belokrylova O.S. Identifikatsiya granits rynka: osobennosti elektronnogo segmenta. Prostranstvo ekonomiki. 2011. № 4–3. 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