sciresНаучные исследования экономического факультета. Электронный журналScientific Research of Faculty of Economics. Electronic Journal2078-3809Moscow State University10.38050/2078-3809-2025-17-3-149-168scires-404Research ArticleКОНКУРЕНТНАЯ И ПРОМЫШЛЕННАЯ ПОЛИТИКАCOMPETITION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICYТеоретические основы регулирования многосторонних рынков, подверженных сетевым эффектамTheoretical Framework for Regulation of Multisided Markets Subject to Network EffectsБоголюбоваВ. С.BogolyubovaV. S.

Боголюбова Виктория Сергеевна, ведущий экономист, научный отдел, экономический факультет

г. Москва

Viktoria S. Bogolyubova, Lead economist, Scientific Department, Faculty of Economics

Moscow

v.bogolubova@gmail.comМГУ имени М.В. ЛомоносоваРоссияLomonosov Moscow State UniversityRussian Federation202516112025173149168Copyright © Боголюбова В.С., 20252025Боголюбова В.С.Bogolyubova V.S.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://scires.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/404

   Несмотря на то, что конкурентные процессы на многостороннем рынке могут влиять положительно на общественное благосостояние, обеспечивая разнообразие предложения, возможна ситуация наличия риска злоупотребления рыночной властью и сохранения угрозы появления новых форм ограничения конкуренции. В данной обзорной статье рассмотрены теоретические положения анализа состояния конкуренции на многостороннем рынке, меняющемся при воздействии отрицательных и перекрестных сетевых эффектов. Предложен способ объяснения устойчивости процесса замедления влияния сетевых эффектов на потребительскую полезность преобладанием эффекта насыщения над эффектом полезности.   К наиболее действенным мерам по поддержанию конкуренции отнесены регулирование процесса установления стандартов, предоставление доступа к ключевым мощностям (к примеру, к программному или аппаратному обеспечению), использования патентного права и лицензирования для защиты прав разработчика продукта относительно собственника системы. Ограничение отрицательного влияния внешних эффектов на стороне потребителя становится ключевой задачей регулятора. Вопрос необходимости разграничения перекрестного и косвенного сетевого эффекта остается открытым.

   Although competitive processes in a multi-sided market can have a positive effect on public welfare, ensuring a supply diversity, there is a risk of market power abuse and a continued threat of the emergence of new forms of competition restriction. This review article examines the theoretical provisions of analyzing the state of competition in the market subject to negative and cross network effects. A method is proposed to explain the process stability of slowing down the influence of network effects on consumer utility by the predominance of the saturation effect over the utility effect.   The most effective measures to support competition include regulation of the standard-setting process, access provision to essential facilities (for example, hardware or software), and implication of patent law and licensing to protect the rights of the product developer in regard to the system owner. Limiting the negative network externality impact on the consumer side becomes a core function of the regulator. The need to distinguish between crossand indirect network effects remains under question.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.