sciresНаучные исследования экономического факультета. Электронный журналScientific Research of Faculty of Economics. Electronic Journal2078-3809Moscow State University10.38050/2078-3809-2025-17-4-173-199scires-429Research ArticleЭКОНОМИКА И ИНСТИТУТЫINSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICSК вопросу о моральном риске на рынке доверительных благTo Question Moral Hazard in Markets for Credence Goods.ЖоринС. О.ZhorinS. O.

Жорин Савелий Олегович, аспирант, кафедра прикладной институциональной экономики, экономический факультет

г. Москва

Saveliy O. Zhorin, Postgraduate student, Department of Applied Institutional Economics, Faculty of Economics

Moscow

zhso21a@econ.msu.ruМГУ имени М.В. ЛомоносоваРоссияLomonosov Moscow State UniversityRussian Federation202505042026174173199Copyright © Жорин С.О., 20262026Жорин С.О.Zhorin S.O.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://scires.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/429

В настоящей статье представлен обзор исследований, связанных с проблемой морального риска на рынках доверительных благ (медицинские услуги, услуги автосервисов и др.). В рамках заданной темы описаны три общие разновидности морального риска, присущие любому рынку доверительных благ: завышение цены, недостаточное и избыточное воздействие. На основе эмпирических исследований рассмотрены такие детерминанты морального риска, как уровень асимметрии информации, моральный риск второй степени, социально-экономический статус потребителя, уровень конкуренции, социальные предпочтения, материальные и репутационные стимулы продавца-эксперта. Разобраны меры, направленные на смягчение проблемы морального риска в контексте рынков доверительных благ – разделение диагностики и воздействия, а также рейтинговые интернет-платформы. Результаты исследования могут найти свое практическое применение в качестве учебных материалов в курсе «Институциональная экономическая теория» для бакалавриата.

This article provides an overview of studies related to the problem of moral hazards in markets for credence goods (medical services, car service and so on). Three different forms of moral hazard inherent in these markets are described: undertreatment, overtreatment and overcharging. Based on empirical studies, we analyze such determinants of moral hazards as level of information asymmetry, second-degree moral hazard, consumer socioeconomic status, competition level, social preferences, material and reputational incentives of expert. We also discuss the following ways to mitigate the moral hazard problem in markets for credence goods – separation of diagnostics and treatment, and internet rating platforms. The results of the study can find their practical application as teaching materials in the course «Institutional Economic Theory» for bachelor’s degree.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.