I and II Type Errors Effects in Law Enforcement
https://doi.org/10.38050/2078-3809-2018-10-4-77-98
Abstract
Different approaches to the definition of I and II type errors, the diagnostics of their emergence and the evaluation of their emergence consequences are considered in this article. An overview of the probability evaluation methods for I and II type error commitment in the law enforcement is provided. A comparative analysis of the judiciary functioning quality based on the survey about respondents’ confidence in the judiciary functioning quality in Russian Federation and several OECD countries was performed. Judicial statistics of the 160 articles of the Criminal Code of Russian Federation was analyzed for the presence of possible I and II type errors commitment. Basing on the legal proceedings of the article, the authors show an example of the analysis of the trial journals and denote some judicial errors. Some measures of the law enforcement quality increase are proposed. The authors come to the conclusion that some potential for judiciary functioning quality improvement exists in Russian Federation.
About the Authors
Elizaveta N. Zelnitskaya
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Graduate student, Faculty of economics
Moscow
Alexey M. Litovchenko
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Graduate student, Faculty of economics
Moscow
Alexandra A. Moskaleva
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Graduate student, Faculty of economics
Moscow
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Review
For citations:
Zelnitskaya E.N., Litovchenko A.M., Moskaleva A.A. I and II Type Errors Effects in Law Enforcement. Scientific Research of Faculty of Economics. Electronic Journal. 2018;10(4):77-89. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.38050/2078-3809-2018-10-4-77-98
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