Restriction of Competition on “Traditional” and Multi-lateral Markets: Common Features and Peculiarities
https://doi.org/10.38050/2078-3809-2020-12-4-56-87
Abstract
Though multi-sided markets are not a new phenomenon, scientists and regulators’ interest in this subject started to rise significantly exactly with the economy's digitalization. The proliferation of such markets inevitably raises a number of questions for economists and antitrust regulators: what are multilateral markets? How much do they differ from the «traditional» ones? What approach should we choose for their regulation: ignore the differences between the two types of the markets, or, on the contrary, focus exactly on them? The answers given to the above questions are of great importance, since they will determine both the future of antitrust policy as well as the welfare of consumers and firms.
This paper examines the differences and similar characteristics of «traditional» and multisided markets, as well as the theoretical aspects of their regulation. Also, the authors of the paper analyze the approaches used by antitrust regulators in the EU,Germany, theUnited Kingdom, theUnited StatesandRussia.
About the Authors
V. A. Dudrina
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Valeriya A. Dudrina - Student, Faculty of Economics
Moscow
V D. Sluzhevskaiia
Lomonosov Moscow State University;
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Valeriia D. Sluzhevskaiia - Leading Economist Lomonosov Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics; Junior Research Fellow, RANEPA, Center for Studies of Competition and Economic Regulation
(MoscowReferences
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Dudrina V.A., Sluzhevskaiia V.D. Restriction of Competition on “Traditional” and Multi-lateral Markets: Common Features and Peculiarities. Scientific Research of Faculty of Economics. Electronic Journal. 2020;12(4):56-87. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.38050/2078-3809-2020-12-4-56-87
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